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


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CADERNOS *de* **REGIONALISMO ODR**



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Foreign Policy and Regionalism: the governments plans of Brazilian presidential candidates in the 2022 elections

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CADERNOS DE REGIONALISMO ODR
DOSSIER - 2022

Foreign Policy and Regionalism: the governments
plans of Brazilian presidential candidates
in the 2022 elections

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FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONALISM THE GOVERNMENTS PLANS OF BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN THE 2022 ELECTIONS

Cairo Junqueira

O the Regionalism Observatory (ODR) is pleased to present the Dossier "Foreign Policy and Regionalism: the programs of the presidential candidates in the 2022 elections" through *Cadernos de Regionalismo ODR* (ISSN 2675-6390) continuing the first activity developed four years ago, when we were also debating presidential campaigns and elections in Brazil.

At that time, we attested an assertion of great value to scholars and interested people in the theme: "foreign policy does not win elections". If this expression remains endorsed, we can say that in fact the themes related to international relations, including the Brazilian foreign policy and the regional aspects, are not central on the eve of elections and in public opinion when compared to other agendas such as economy, public security, education and health. However, now in 2022 we can update this statement: "foreign policy does not win elections, but it can influence them".

And what has changed? Upon referring to 2018, Casarões (2019, p. 231, translated) stated that "[...] foreign policy came out of the kitchen and entered the living room. But instead of sitting politely with the other ones, generated inconvenience and astonishment by climbing on the table." Issues related to diplomacy and regionalism, that were previously secondary factors, produced heated debates in the presidential race due to political polarization and the new position of Jair Bolsonaro, the incoming president-elect.

Bolsonaro created a disruption in the historical legacy established by Brazilian foreign policy, in general, and by diplomacy, specifically. According to Cervo (2008), zealous,

universalist, pacifist, cooperative and development-oriented practices are central characteristics of Brazilian international relations. Principles established as self-determination, respect for international negotiations, multilateralism, international cooperation, peaceful settlement of controversies, pragmatism and cordiality with regional neighbors are our consecrated attributes. And it has changed in the last few years. Foreign policy climbed on the table and, more importantly, those who were seated just stood up, leaving Brazil even more alone.

We mention alone, but not isolated or necessarily solitaire, because some relationship circles continued to be established with countries such as the United States, Israel, Hungary, and Poland. The ideological bias of the "olavista" perspective (SARAIVA; SILVA, 2019) gripped Bolsonaro's foreign policy referring to the influence of Olavo de Carvalho in figures such as Filipe Martins, Advisor for International Affairs of the Presidency, Eduardo Bolsonaro, Congressman and Former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and Ernesto Araújo, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the words of the latter, it was better for Brazil to be even an international pariah or to be left outside the world order (FERNANDES, 2020).

Due to these recent transformations, the Dossier acquires even more importance by showing in direct and clear language, through the prospection of official documents and media news, how presidential candidates are guiding the themes of foreign policy and regionalism in their campaigns, speeches and, mainly, government plans.

We open the analysis with the candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the Workers Party (PT), which resumes several guidelines of the so-called active and proactive foreign policy implemented during his administrations between 2003 and 2011, besides evidencing that it is necessary for the country to resume its ties of friendship and international prestige, recovering the favorable image generated during that period. Thereafter, we examine the program of the current president, Jair Bolsonaro, of the Liberal Party (PL), whose international guidelines reaffirm neoliberal and conservative precepts, but compared to previous years we observe a more professional tone around the foreign policy agenda. The candidate reaffirms Itamaraty values and changes the tone in relation to the permanent criticism of the International Liberal Order. However, the regional arena remains unhighlighted, with virtually no mention of Latin America and South America.

The third review is about Ciro Gomes, of the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), which does not have coalitions and is running for the fourth time for the Presidency. Although with speech, tone and remarkably developmental proposals, his government program does not present foreign policy guidelines. Other sources show that the candidate reaffirms national principles as the defense of sovereignty, values multilateral relations and focuses on Latin American integration, emphasizing forums and regional blocs, such as BRICS and Mercosur.

Simone Tebet, of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), also underlines in her government plan the need to recover Brazil's international image in multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), but with one particularity: this would also be carried out mainly through trade and the attraction of private investments. For example, in the case of Mercosur, Tebet raises the necessity for liberalization of goods and products, reaffirming the free market policy view.

Finally, our last analysis brings a compilation of the eight candidates who have the lowest voting intentions in the 2022 Brazilian elections, as declared at the end of May (TUVUCA; RAMALHOSO, 2022). Along with visible political and ideological differences, as an overview, none of these candidatures presents a foreign policy agenda with novelties or innovations, reaffirming commitments with leftists' governments or ratifying the requirement for trade liberalization as a mainline for regional integration processes.

Alongside this brief introduction we hope that this Dossier, presented with open access, will contribute as a source of teaching materials, become academic analysis or even hold future public debates. We also wish a pleasant reading, expecting better times for our foreign policy and with greater significance to face our regional challenges.

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LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA

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Maurício Luiz Borges Ramos Dias*

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Accepted in: 2 September 2022.

Candidacies

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Partido dos Trabalhadores), presidente
Geraldo José Rodrigues Alckmin Filho (Partido Socialista Brasileiro), vice-presidente

Coalition

“Brazil of Hope” (PT, PSB, PCdoB, PV, PSOL, REDE, SOLIDARIEDADE, AVANTE, AGIR)

Previous political positions

Federal Deputy for São Paulo state (1987-1991); President of the Republic (2003-2010)

Previous presidential campaigns

1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2018¹

International Relations advisor

PT's International Relations Secretariat (under the responsibility of Romênio Pereira);
Celso Amorim (former Lula government chancellor and current external adviser)

Given the current socio-economic and political conjunctures in post-redemocratization Brazil, the 2022 elections mark not only the return of former president Lula and former governor Geraldo Alckmin to public life, but the union, on the same political ticket, of candidates from very different origins and backgrounds, even marked as adversaries in the past. Two politicians with extensive administrative experience, each with their own characteristics and world views, at first, opposed, but who sought to complement each other to echo a unified criticism against the current government of Jair Bolsonaro. From this ticket emerges the promise of defending democracy and returning to a past of prosperity and hope not far from the affective memory of the Brazilian population - in this case, the federal administrations of the Workers' Party (PT) between 2003 and 2010.

Born into a poor family in the interior of the state of Pernambuco, but who migrated as a child to the industrial region of ABC Paulista, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva grew up and stood out within the Brazilian union movement. As one of the founders of the PT, he became one of the most prominent leaders of the civil society movement for the end of the military dictatorship (1964-1985). With redemocratization, he was a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, having been elected in 2002, re-elected in 2006 - including defeating Geraldo Alckmin - in addition to having promoted Dilma Rousseff as his successor in 2010.

Despite being re-elected in 2014, Rousseff was impeached in 2016. In the wake of corruption scandals linked to the police operation 'Car-Wash', Lula was arrested in 2018, at the time he was already a candidate for a third presidential term. At the end of 2019, however, he had all the charges annulled by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and was released from prison, having his political rights restored in 2021.

According to polls (INSTITUTO DATAFOLHA, 2022), Lula maintains a relatively advantageous leadership trajectory compared to other candidates and with a level of rejection below that of his main opponent, President Jair Bolsonaro - even with the possibility of being elected in the first round. These are, however, very polarized elections and already marked by an escalation of political violence, accompanied by threats to the electoral process and democratic institutions.

In the midst of debates and analyzes regarding government proposals, this paper proposes to present the views of Lula's candidacy, specifically, for Brazilian foreign

policy. To this end, commitments assumed based on the guidelines published by the “Brazil of Hope” coalition (PT, PSB, PCdoB, PV, PSOL, REDE, SOL, AVT, AGIR) (BRASIL, 2022) as well as in the 'Plan of Reconstruction and Transformation of Brazil', organized by the Perseu Abramo Foundation (FPA) - PT think tank -, in addition to public exhibitions made by the candidate and influential members of the party in the area linked to the theme (FUNDAÇÃO PERSEU ABRAMO, 2022).

Given this context, with a certain nostalgic look, Lula determines the need to recover the Brazilian condition of the global protagonist through the renewal of an ‘active and proactive foreign policy’. As defended by the ticket, this process would provide the defense of Brazil's sovereignty towards its national interests that can be achieved by its foreign (re)insertion, as well as regain its international prestige as a country that works for democracy, peace, development and self-determination.

In a practical way, the return of an active and proactive foreign policy would reorient Brazil towards regional integration with South America, Latin America and the Caribbean, with a view to inducing development in the region; South-South cooperation with the Latin American and African continents; the strengthening of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Union of South American Nations (Unasur), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) and BRICS (comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa); and greater Brazilian participation in multilateral organizations. Therefore, this foreign policy proposal is based on the strengthening of Brazilian multilateralism in line with the free, pragmatic and non-submissive establishment of Brazil with different nations and organizations. Furthermore, Lula's commitment to participate in the formation of a global order based on multilateralism, environmental sustainability, peace, social inclusion and respect for the sovereignty of countries stands out.

Latin America features prominently in the PT's international policy agenda, and South and Latin American integration is considered a priority for Brazil's relations with its neighboring countries, defended as a mechanism to promote regional security and the development of regional production chains - based on "potential productive complementarities" and physical integration, via infrastructure -, started on the strengthening of development instruments such as the Fund for Structural Convergence of Mercosur (Focem) and the Bank of the South, and organizations in South America to

the Caribbean, such as Mercosur, Unasur and Celac - the Forum for the Progress and Integration of South America (Prosur), started in 2019 and proposed as a “non-ideological” regional replacement for Unasur, was not mentioned by the party.

There is great concern about recovering Brazilian international prestige and national sovereignty considered lost since the party left power, although such recovery is not explicit in more specific proposals in the government plan. Nevertheless, it could be highlighted, quite recently, public statements by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lula government and international policy consultant to the PT, Celso Amorim, in defense of Bolivia's full membership of Mercosur as part of the strengthening of the bloc and its international projection; to make adjustments to the agreement already approved with the European Union (EU); questions about the reduction of the common external tariff, in addition to the possibility of Brazil joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (WALTENBERG, 2022). Furthermore, the defense of the importance of formulating a regional integration that will work with different speeds and specific responsibilities for each regional organization is observed, if Latin America wants to be heard at the international level (CELAC, 2022).

It is worth mentioning a certain personalist and identity character, based on the personal figure of the former president and current presidential candidate, as a resource of great impact in relations with Latin America. Lula, after the death of Venezuelan Hugo Chávez and Argentine Néstor Kirchner, is considered the great living reference of the period of the so-called “pink wave”, in which so-called progressive or left-wing parties and leaders were interested in Latin American integration during the 2000s, being treated with deference and admiration by politicians on the continent, despite the political change in Brazil.

As new progressive governments rise in Latin America in recent years – Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Colombia, respectively, to the point of considering a “new pink wave” underway in the region – more audiences and expectations about Lula's candidacy are created. Lula, on the other hand, is not exempt from communicating with his neighbors, whether by congratulating electoral victories or visiting political leaders in the region.

A great example of the relevance of Lula's figure was the visit in 2019 of the then

Peronist candidate for the Argentine presidency, Alberto Fernández, to the Brazilian former president - even though he was still in prison. After Alberto was elected, Lula, now freed, had a great public reception during his visit to Buenos Aires on his visit to the Argentine president at the end of last year.

In Lula's government plan, the commercial aspect is portrayed by factors to be reformulated. In the international market, one of the approaches is to progressively relieve the taxation of products with higher added value and embedded technology, while domestically, it is estimated to prioritize the fight against inflation, especially in the prices of food, fuel and electricity. Regarding fuels, Lula estimates that he will prevent pre-salt gains, currently affected by its dollarized parity, from being reduced by "Brazilianizing" their prices and expanding national production through new refining parks.

As far as the agricultural trade balance, the need to encourage greater added value to the sector's production was highlighted as a way of increasing its global competitiveness. Furthermore, it was emphasized that agriculture and livestock must be committed to social and environmental sustainability, while gaining space in the international market and fighting hunger.

In a meeting with businessmen at the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), on August 5, 2022, with Geraldo Alckmin as a strategic link with the business wing, Lula made pertinent statements (BIMBATI; TEIXEIRA, 2022). Among his promises, there was the guarantee of regaining the international credibility, predictability and stability of the country as an intermediary to receive new investments and expand international negotiations.

Recognizing the imposition of the climate crisis, caused by excessive consumption and production patterns, as a catastrophic future, Lula emphasizes in his government plan the need for Brazil to carry out its ecological transition. Moreover, the candidate intends to implement Brazilian commitments to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions, as provided for in the 2015 Paris Agreement, and implement an energy transition. This process would range from boosting a productive paradigm based on sustainability, the broad conservation of biodiversity and Brazilian terrestrial and maritime ecosystems, the fight against environmental crime, to the recovery and reforestation of degraded lands.

Further on the environmental agenda, in a press conference held on August 22, 2022,

Lula (PODER 360, 2022) that the possible resolution of the climate crisis will come from a joint international action in a desired new global configuration. In this sense, PT denotes the urgency of discussing unprecedented global geopolitics, with more countries participating in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in new international institutions, which need to produce strong climate discussions and ensure that they are implemented within the domestic sphere of each State.

Likewise, without giving up national sovereignty and with a view to Latin America, the importance of promoting the conservation of the Amazon together with Amazonian countries, such as Colombia and Ecuador, was highlighted. In other words, it is clear that Lula understands not only the Brazilian responsibilities with respect to domestic biodiversity and the maintenance of the international climate, but also to condition, cooperatively, other countries for joint discussions and actions.

It was noted that, given the current situation, the government plan does not mention certain strategic issues for the international reintegration of Brazil, such as Brazilian positions with China and the United States. Thus, Lula's pronouncements on these themes were sought so that we can understand the possible paths of Brazilian foreign policy towards these countries, if elected.

Moving away from an automatic and unrewarded alignment with the United States, as defended by Bolsonaro during the Donald Trump administration, Lula, in a critical tone, indicated that, during his previous administrations, his foreign policy “never allowed the Brazil to speak slightly to the United States”(PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES, 2022, s.p). In this way, opposing a position of self-imposed subalternity and the current distance between Brazil and Joe Biden, the candidate demonstrates his desire to direct interactions with the United States towards the Brazilian national interest.

Similarly, as highlighted by Celso Amorim (CASADO, 2022), in a different pattern, Sino-Brazilian relations would not be based on Bolsonaro's intense ideological aversion to China, but rather on pragmatism in a possible Lula administration, without degrading the relationship of Brazil with the United States, the EU and Latin American neighbors. In this light, it is worth mentioning that Lula plans to position Brazil in different contexts involving Sino-American disputes, without, therefore, a fixed alignment devoid of strategy, with the objective of reheating the economy through new foreign

investments and reducing the industrial dependence on Asia.

Finally, in relation to the proposed foreign policy, it was deemed necessary to have clearer positions on the interaction of Lula and the PT with governments said to be leftists that are not internationally recognized as democracies - specifically Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua - and how this situation would be incompatible with the defense of democracy and human rights as a pillar of its foreign action. When asked in a recent interview in 'Jornal Nacional', Lula did not directly criticize these countries, he only pointed to self-determination as a basic premise for democracy, together with the need to dialogue with the different (JORNAL NACIONAL).

In the candidate's own words, Brazil must return to an active and proactive foreign policy, turning back to a period when the country was internationally respected and admired, as well as considering circumstances inherent to our contemporaneity. In general terms, with an appreciation for the past, Lula's project for the international (re)insertion of Brazil intends to resume what the country once achieved abroad, in addition to new contemporary challenges, such as, for example, the climate crisis, that must be overcome.

Notes

¹ Lula was arrested in April 2018 and had his candidacy contested by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Fernando Haddad (PT-SP) and Manuela d'Ávila (PCdoB-RS) formed the replacement ticket for the 2018 election.

² The STF annulled the accusations against Lula on the grounds that the evidence was generated illegally by the Federal Police's 'Car-Wash' operation team, as well as the decision by the then responsible judge, Sérgio Moro, that was considered partial and suspicious.

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JAIR BOLSONARO

*Heitor Erthal
Luan Oliveira Pessoa¹*

Received in: 21 August 2022
Accepted in: 30 August 2022.

Candidates

Jair Messias Bolsonaro (Partido Liberal), presidente
Walter Souza Braga Netto (Partido Liberal), vice-presidente

Coalition

“For the good of Brazil” (PP/REPUBLICANS/PL)

Previous political positions

City Councilor of Rio de Janeiro/RJ (1989-1991); Federal Deputy for Rio de Janeiro state (1991-2019); President of the Republic (2019-current)

Previous presidential campaigns

2018

International relations advisor

Unknown/uncertain

The reelection candidate for the Brazilian Presidency Jair Messias Bolsonaro aspires to a new term, so he gives continuity to his current government. He was a Federal Deputy for the State of Rio de Janeiro and a military officer from the Brazilian Army; now, he is part of the Liberal Party (*PL*, in Portuguese), as well as his running mate, retired general Braga Netto. Centralizing the campaign in one party is unusual in Brazilian politics, where the vice-president place can be offered to an aligned party. There were speculations on other names for the vice-president position, like the former ministers Damareo Alves and Teresa Cristina, as a gesture towards the female vote, but the general was chosen. In the election pulls, Bolsonaro placed second, following the former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

This article intends to explore the Government's Plan for a possible new term for Bolsonaro 2023-2026. The main goal is to analyze the plan's foreign policy and regionalism ideas for a future government. It is entitled *For the good of Brazil*, it has 48 pages on many dear issues for the government to be (PELO BEM DO BRASIL, 2022). Notwithstanding, other sources will be used, such as the Government Plan of the 2018 election and the foreign policy made by the Bolsonaro administration.

Bolsonaro was elected President by the Social Liberal Party (*PSL*, in Portuguese) and left it in 2019. Then the President stayed partyless until 2021 when he decided to join the PL. Moreover, a group of his allies followed him to the new party, such as senator Flavio Bolsonaro, his son. Bolsonaro's entry into the PL consolidates his movement towards the *Centrão* — a group of Congresspeople from center-right parties, who prioritize their private interests instead of the public good — intending to have a bigger political base in the Congress, therefore more support for the government agenda and his reelection. This contradicted his 2018 campaign, in which he claimed to be an anti-establishment candidate against corruption.

The presidential-ticket Bolsonaro-Braga Netto officially formed a party coalition gathering PL, Progressives (PP), and Republicans. The Republicans are the youngest out of those, founded in 2003. It is associated with the evangelical Christian denomination Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, an electorate niche for Bolsonaro reelection. The PP originated from the National Renewal Alliance (*ARENA*, in Portuguese), a core party in support of the Brazilian Military Dictatorship (1964-1985). Those three are parties that tried to reinvent themselves to attract more votes in the current Brazilian

political scenario, featured by hate against politics, “desideolization” and demands for renovation in politics (MODZELESKI; CALGARO, 2017).

The fact that Bolsonaro has a presidential ticket based on one single party, the *PL*, this article paid attention to the values and ideas stated by the *PL* program (PARTIDO LIBERAL, 2022). Thus, it defends representative democracy, private property, and a society without ideologies. The document declares that ideologies divide societies, creating conflict and disunity. The State would work as a mediation institution, standing for human rights, safeguarding freedom and the survival of the private sector. The party also is in favor of federalism and the division of the three powers as pillars of the State. Moreover, the document also explains some ideas about international politics and foreign policy.

There is a small section in the last part of the program where the party establishes some ideas on international politics and foreign policy for Brazil. It explains that Brazil has to prioritize the self-determination of the people and the non-intervention of foreign actors, going along with some of Itamaraty's historical values. At the same time, it understands the importance of Latin American integration and the need to strengthen community sentiment at a regional level. It determines that Brazil should forge bonds with diverse international actors, building a relationship between North-South that results in a more even power distribution in the international system. Even though the *PL* has some ideas on those topics, there is no institutional division of it that studies international relations.

Those mentioned ideas are part of the current Government Plan. The plan *For the good of Brazil* is different from the one made in 2018, *The path of prosperity*. The ideological feature based on conservative-anticommunism is no longer the plan's cornerstone (CAMINHO DA PROSPERIDADE, 2018). In other words, the propositions are not pledging for a new Crusade, against the left reify on the Workers' Party (*PT*, in Portuguese). The current plan still has cross-cut right conservative ideas. Furthermore, it advocates for the family as the main responsible institution for children's education, and speeches against women's rights to abortion. In economic topics, the plan strongly supports neoliberalism, endorsing private entrepreneurship and taking responsibility from the State. Its main responsibility is to guard individual freedom.

As parties were more long-established than the *PSL* in 2018, the *PL* and the other

parties of the coalition have influenced the structure and organization of the plan, when the anti-systemic and outsider features are no longer effective, and the plans show signs of expertise in the campaign. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro was responsible for coordinating the preparation of the document and he had suggestions from political leaders, such as Ciro Nogueira, leader of PP; Valdemar da Costa Neto, leader of *PL* and his running mate, Braga Netto (COSTA, 2022). In addition, it also had guidance from economists throughout the document, stated as specialists on the topic by the plan. Likewise, the layout became more professional, quite different from what was presented in 2018.

The introductory and text presentation of the plan has economy as the most important issue, afterwards values and principles are presented. The structure of the document is based on the six strategic axes. This organization of the text, mainly the strategic reasoning (“*fundamentação estratégica*”, in Portuguese), alludes to institutional presentations made in private companies. In that regard, this visual choice increases the plan’s liberal feature presented in the economic topics, and the relevance of the private companies’ behavior in the next term of public administration.

Notwithstanding the program point out that “[t]here must be a wider angle to comprehend the direction that the world might take” (PELO BEM DO BRASIL, 2022, p. 6, free translation), it blames the Brazilian current economic troubles on the COVID-19 pandemic; the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the improvement in the quality of life of populations in the “Orient”. Thus, the candidate claims that the reasons for fuel shortages and rising food prices are due to international factors that are exogenous to the government.

Despite these global setbacks, Brazil is no longer placed in the role of critic of the Liberal International Order (FARIAS; CASARÕES; MAGALHÃES, 2022) aiming at the formation of a new order with other countries under extreme right governments, such as Hungary and Turkey. This time, Brazil appears as a relevant country to contribute to the solutions to the current problems of the “West”. The vision in 2022 about Brazil’s place in the International System is a profound counterpoint to what was proposed in the 2018 program, in the same way, that it differs from Ernesto Araújo’s administration at Itamaraty (2019-2021), even though he continues to guide “Occident” and “Orient”.

The plan section on foreign policy is the last of the strategic axes (“Governance and

Geopolitics”) and is combined with the defense policy. That section begins with an allusion to values historically defended by Itamaraty: the “multilateral global order, international law and the Charter of the United Nations” (PELO BEM DO BRASIL, 2022, p. 44, free translation). The program goes on to state that Brazil is fundamental in contributing to the solution of several contemporary international agendas, despite not detailing non-trade agendas from an international perspective. Converging with these values, Brazilian foreign policy should strive for a universalist vocation, building ties with all the members of the United Nations (UN). Once again, it marks the change in relation to the 2018 program.

The proposals for 2023-2026 address interacting and cooperating more with "democratic countries" and based on free enterprise, while at the same time defending that Brazil should be more "friendly" and "close" to as many countries as possible. Thus, the proposal will increase trade with more development partners through bilateral and multilateral agreements. In this context, the program aims to position the country within the current order, as well as the desire to win Brazil entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)². This stance of greater openness to dialogue appears as a response to the criticisms that report loss of international credibility during the first term (2019-2022) (GHIROTTO, 2020).

Despite the fact that the document does not name enemies or negative examples and other mentioned changes, the geographical environment remains a topic that has not been addressed much. There is no specific proposal on Brazil's relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean or South America. These regions are only named indirectly within the universalist argument for State relationships or to inform that inflation has not only affected Brazil. The most significant mention is the appreciation of the South American ministerial meeting on transnational organized crime in June 2022 in Brasília. Furthermore, there is no mention of any specific regional initiative, neither Mercosur nor the Forum for the Progress and Integration of South America (*PROSUR*, in Spanish)³. Mercosur is implicitly noted in the appreciation of the negotiations concluded with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), while the European Union (EU) is an absence, despite the conclusion of the Mercosur-EU negotiations, comparatively, have been much more celebrated.

Therefore, the most elaborate proposal in its external agenda is the intention to be

part of the OECD, in order to help the project, attract investments and capital and strengthen ties with developed countries. Historical principles of Brazilian diplomacy are affirmed in the program and even concerns about external dependence are expressed, but without resorting to regional instruments. However, neoliberal and conservative precepts follow manifestos as beacons for the proposals. Although it may be common in the anti-globalist extreme right forces in the world, the ambivalence between neoliberal economic policies and the state protection of the population against globalization crises (SANAHUJA; LÓPEZ BURIAN, 2022) has increased, in the face of reelection, with Bolsonaro's approach to *Centrão*. In the same way, this relation has given slightly more diluted contours to reactionary internationalism and challenges to the political system, although, they are still present, as in the recent speech to foreign diplomats about Brazilian electronic voting machines (SPIGARIOL; NICAS, 2022).

Notes

- ¹ This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001.
- ² The OECD is an international organization initially treated as a “club of rich countries”, which demands a series of reforms and public policies for membership, many of them limiting the scope for action of the State and Brazilian foreign policy itself.
- ³ PROSUR is a forum proposed in 2019 by Chile and Colombia, with Brazilian support, in order to constitute itself as a non-ideological alternative to replace the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, in Spanish) and isolating, especially, the Nicolás Maduro presidency in Venezuela (HERNANDEZ; MESQUITA, 2020).

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CIRO GOMES

Flavia Loss de Araujo
João Victor Motta

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Candidates

Ciro Ferreira Gomes (Partido Democrático Trabalhista), presidente
Ana Paula Andrade Matos Moreira (Partido Democrático Trabalhista), vice-presidente

Coalition

Partido sem coligação (PDT)

Previous political positions

State Deputy in Ceará (1983-1988); Mayor of Fortaleza/CE (1989-1990); Governor of Ceará state (1991-1994); Minister of Finance (1994-1995); Minister of National Integration (2003-2006); Federal Deputy for Ceará (2007-2011); Health Secretary of Ceará state (2013 and 2015).

Previous presidential campaigns

1998, 2002, 2018

International Relations Advisor

PDT's Secretary for International Relations (under the responsibility of Márcio Bins Ely)

The year 2022 marks the fourth candidacy for the presidency of the Republic of Brazil by Ciro Gomes, after his best result in the 2018 elections¹. The presidential candidate from Ceará² will run again for the Democratic Labor Party (PDT)³ with a coreligionist as a candidate for vice president, a public servant and former vice mayor of Salvador (Bahia), Ana Paula Matos.

Ciro Gomes worked as a lawyer and university professor⁴, but he stood out for his solid public trajectory, having been elected to different legislative and executive positions, and nominated as a minister twice, in governments of different political spectrums. In the current electoral dispute, the pedetista candidacy will come out without coalitions with other political parties. For the fifth time, the PDT presents its own presidential candidacy⁵ and, this time, with a government plan guided by the so-called “National Development Project (PND)”. Defended by Ciro Gomes at other times and in the previous election and presented in the candidate's book entitled “Projeto Nacional: O dever da esperança” (National Project: The Duty of Hope), launched in 2020.

The program is part of an analysis of the country's socioeconomic situation, with notes on economic stagnation, growth in unemployment, the increase in poverty and misery, in addition to pointing out issues such as the growth of violence. In these elections, unlike the previous ones, Ciro Gomes and the PDT present a leaner government program, oriented to a few themes, such as: economic and technological development, labor agenda (creation of jobs and social security), tax issues, environmental guidelines, role of state-owned companies -in particular, Petrobras- education, health, culture, combating poverty and misery, combating corruption, public security and social and animal rights.

The developmental orientation of the government program guides the proposals and the tone of the text for a macroeconomic agenda focused on job recovery, reforms and industrial development, with few changes compared to the previous program. Although smaller, Ciro Gomes' government plan is similar to his previous campaign.

The surprise in the PDT Government Plan for 2022 is the absence of foreign policy in its program presented to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), since there are no structured mentions on the topic or mentions about regional integration. In summary, the plan presents the following sentence about international politics: “trade and diplomatic negotiations will follow two essential principles: the defense of national

interests and the sovereignty of the country”⁶(GOMES,2022).

There are mentions about multilateral spaces, such as the United Nations (UN), with respect to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, compared to the presidential candidate's previous programs, there is a reduction in debates on international issues, with no mention of regional organizations.

In this way, the main proposals of Gomes' candidacy are present on an auxiliary campaign website available online since 2016 (GOMES, 2022b). This platform details some of Ciro Gomes' proposals, including his agenda for foreign policy. In this space, the constitutional principles of Brazilian external action are highlighted, such as peace and self-determination. Given the scarcity of information on the government plan, this text will use the campaign website, an interview with the candidate given in March 2022 and the book “Projeto Nacional” to analyze its proposals for Brazil's international action.

Ciro Gomes' foreign policy orientation indicates a preference for "break with the interdictions of financing and technology transfer, in addition to opening more diversified markets”(GOMES, 2022b). In that sense, the BRICS⁷ emerge with centrality in its proposition, for enabling the creation of “new political, legal, commercial, technology transfer and funding sources dynamics”(GOMES, 2022b), moving away from dependency relationships with the US.

In this sense, its construction presents a dynamic of defense of spaces such as Mercosur and other multilateral processes not subordinated to the central powers. The understanding of Ciro Gomes' proposals about South America and Latin America starts from the fact that integration with these territories is a constitutional provision, emphasizing that this integration must be built beyond geographic proximity, emphasizing the need for a unity against the ‘European colonial exploitation and the consolidation of a 'non-Latin America’, which, according to the arguments, was imposed on the region and “was strengthened by the post-war international division of labor”(GOMES, 2022b).

In this way, the PND “cannot do without integration with Caribbean and Latin American countries due to the convergence of interests and the possibility of mutual help” (CIRO GOMES, 2022). Ciro Gomes has recently made statements that diverge from the leftist and progressive governments that ruled in Latin America in the first

decade of this century (period of the so-called “Pink Wave”), as when he characterized the Cuban regime as a dictatorship (GOMES, 2021). At the same time, Gomes criticizes the US blockade, which he considers wrong and harmful to the Caribbean country.

In the book “Projeto Nacional”(GOMES, 2020), in which it exposes the PND, Ciro Gomes makes some remarks on the subject. Once again, he emphasizes the role of Mercosur in the region - he inserts its participation in the construction of the bloc as minister of Itamar Franco, points out that the integration project did not achieve its original promise and considers that it suffers from attempts to make it unfeasible by foreign powers. For the presidential candidate, Mercosur was an important factor in improving Brazil's external image.

Gomes, in his book, reinforces points of his program presented on his online platform, in which Latin American integration is “an economic and strategic imperative foreseen in the Constitution”, in addition to distancing itself from the propositions that it calls “Bolivarian discourse”. In addition, it preaches a certain precaution in relation to the USA, recalling the interventions in Brazil and other Latin American countries carried out during the Cold War period.

In summary, the document says that “Latin American integration and the BRICS continue to be the best opportunities for strategic partnerships for the country, thanks to some complementary characteristics between the economies of the blocs”(GOMES, 2022). In an interview given in early 2022, the candidate argues that it is necessary that our foreign relations approach the guarantee of our sovereignty, the defense of the environment, the fight against terrorism, in addition to pointing out its economic agenda associated with the Brazilian international insertion (regime of industrial preferences, technological transfers and regimes of alternative financing to the IMF)(MYNEWS, 2022).

In his book and during the interview mentioned above, there are quotes about the principles of Barão do Rio Branco, in addition to emphasizing the importance of building a foreign policy based on pragmatism. It also reinforces the need for these principles to be stable so that we can coherently position ourselves on major global and regional issues from the mediation of conflicts and non-alignment with great powers that are in moments of tension with each other. An important point to be mentioned, during the interview, Ciro Gomes points out the need to rethink the national defense

strategy, based on the need to provide the country with dissuasive elements.

Regarding the Mercosur-EU agreement, an important issue for the conjuncture of South American regionalism, Ciro Gomes declares himself in favor of free trade but understands that trade relations were never really liberal, therefore, the agreement must be rethought and balanced from interests and needs of internal construction and development. In this sense, the relevance of Mercosur for Gomes goes beyond the trade agenda and should continue to advance in regulatory, social security, tax, infrastructure and related issues.

Finally, in the sphere of regional integration, the focus is on proposals for South American regionalism, emphasizing Mercosur; and in the construction of an economic policy that includes issues such as industrial development, productive requalification and Brazilian repositioning vis-à-vis the world. It is important to highlight the lack of depth on foreign policy and regional integration at the government level, with the absence of terms such as South America, Mercosur, integration and the like. It then bequeathed to other spaces and pronouncements the deepening of its positions and central pillars: multilateralism, non-intervention, sovereignty and defense of national interests.

Thus, the program lacks greater detailing of international and regional policies, with the great distinction compared to previous elections, with public positions contrary to some political regimes in the region, such as Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua; in addition to the greater recurrence of criticism of former President Lula's foreign policy and his association with governments considered by Ciro as undemocratic. In relation to the current president Jair Bolsonaro, Ciro's positions are effusive and completely at odds with his conduct of foreign policy, especially with regard to the environmental issue.

Notes

¹ With 12.47% of the votes in the first round, ranking third. In 1998, it reached 10.97% (third place) and in 2002, 11.97% (fourth place).

² Born in Pindamonhangaba (SP), he moved as a child to Ceará, his family's state, where he built his political career.

³ In his political career he went through seven parties: PDS (1982), PMDB (1983-1988), PSDB (1988-1997), PPS (1997-2005), PSB (2005-2013), PROS (2013-2015), PDT (2015-present). Information available at: CPDOC-FGV. GOMES, Ciro (Verbetes), online.

⁴ He was professor of Tax Law at the University of Fortaleza and professor of Public and Private Law Institutions at the University of Vale de Aracá.

⁵ In presidential elections, the party presented its own candidacy in 1989 and 1994, with Leonel Brizola; in 2006, Cristovam Buarque; and in 2018, Ciro Gomes himself.

⁶ Looking at the platform's source code, we see that the Foreign Policy area was originally published in 2018, and last modified in 2022.

⁷ Acronym for the group of countries formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

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SIMONE TEBET

Paulo Cesar dos Santos Martins

Received in: 23 August 2022

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Candidates

Simone Nassar Tebet (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/MDB), presidente

Mara Cristina Gabrilli (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira/PSDB), vice-presidente

Coalition

“Brazil for all” (MDB, PSDB, CITIZENSHIP, PODEMOS)

Previous political positions

State Deputy for Mato Grosso do Sul (2002 – 2004); Mayor of Três Lagoas/MS (2005 – 2010); Vice-Governor for Mato Grosso do Sul state (2011 – 2014); Senator Mato Grosso do Sul state (2015 – current)

Previous presidential campaigns

No

International relations advisor

Embaixador José Alfredo Graça Lima

Candidate for the Presidency of the Republic by the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), Simone Nassar Tebet, senator elected in 2014 by the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), managed to place her candidacy and make her official run for the Palácio da Alvorada after a period of uncertainty and resistance from some members of the party itself, who even called the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) against the senator's candidacy (GARCIA, 2022) . Such resistance involved political differences within the party itself as there was no unanimity among members in support of Tebet's candidacy for the presidency.

Born in Três Lagoas/MS and a lawyer at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Simone Tebet was elected state deputy for the state in 2002, mayor of the municipality of Três Lagoas/MS in 2004, vice governor of the state of MS in 2010 and elected senator in 2014. The senator constitutes herself as a name of the third way” (ESTADÃO CONTEÚDO, 2022) , an alternative that postulates the construction of another way capable of going to the second round of the 2022 elections in the face of polarization and antagonism linked to the two main candidates best placed .

Mara Cristina Gabrilli from the MDB, vice candidate on the ticket, is from São Paulo and was elected senator for the same state in 2018. Graduated in psychology from Universidade Paulista and in social communication (advertising and advertising) from Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing, she became a councilor for the São Paulo City Council in 2007, being re-elected in 2008. In 2014, she was elected federal deputy for the state of São Paulo and Senator for the same state in 2018.

For the first time as candidates for the Presidency of the Republic and supported by the party federation of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and Citizenship, made official on July 27, 2022, the articulation to consolidate the ticket of Tebet and Mara took place after the withdrawal (G1 SP, 2022), on May 23, 2022, of the former governor of São Paulo João Doria as a PSDB pre-candidate for the Palácio do Planalto. On August 5th, the Podemos political party announced its support for Tebet's presidential candidacy, raising the number of parties that officially support his candidacy to four (BRASIL, 2022).

The candidate's 48-page government plan (BRASIL, 2022) entitled “Principles, Guidelines and Commitment” was registered with the TSE on August 15, 2022 and proposes a broad and comprehensive reconstruction of the country, covering sensitive

topics such as economic growth, hunger and misery, inequality, employment, quality of life for the population, among others. The document is divided into four main axes: social justice, citizenship and combating inequalities; green economy and sustainable development; government partner of the private sector; inclusive, secure and transparent government.

In general terms, the government plan presents some proposals on the following themes: social inequality, education, health, work, housing, culture, environment, economy, infrastructure, diplomacy, institutions, diversity and human rights, people with disabilities and public safety.

The foreign policy of the government plan is linked to macroeconomic initiatives and support for private investments described in axis 3. Through this axis, the candidate proposes to resume Brazilian leadership in commercial areas through dialogue, seeking to implement new economic agreements, modernization of the country's infrastructure, greater integration and participation of the Brazilian State in the international economy, as well as improving Brazil's image in international discussion spaces and forums.

The logic of the plan consists of recovering the prestige of Brazilian diplomacy in the various international forums, using the extensive network of diplomatic representations abroad to facilitate bilateral flows of people, goods, services, investments and technology. It is therefore proposed to intensify the country's participation in the work of the United Nations (UN), particularly in those aimed at: mitigating climate change; promote sustainable development; to guarantee international peace and security; fight arms and drug trafficking, corruption, terrorism and cyber warfare, reform the UN Charter, expand its Security Council, among other global issues.

The government's plan also defends the reinforcement of Latin American integration, deepening existing agreements and negotiating new agreements, promoting physical integration and investments in infrastructure in South America, in order to take advantage of the movements of reconfiguration of international value chains. . As for Mercosur, the plan understands that the bloc's consolidation requires the creation of proposals and actions aimed at liberalizing trade in goods and services, and the movement of people and capital among its members.

Another important point of the government's plan is the reinvigoration of Brazil's role in the World Trade Organization (WTO), helping to make the multilateral trading

system more open and less discriminatory. Furthermore, greater Brazilian engagement is sought in the discussions of plurilateral groups in which Brazil participates, such as the G-20 and BRICS¹. This proposal aims to strengthen multilateralism and further advance in the process of accessing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), conceived as an opportunity for a general review of national public policies, aiming at their improvement in the light of best experiences and practices.

Furthermore, the government plan states that Brazil's international role needs to be resumed, placing the country as the leader of the global geopolitical agenda over the next few decades, emphasizing themes related to sustainability, the green economy, and the carbon credit market. properly structured and developed. For this, it is necessary to repress the degradation of the Amazon, end deforestation, recover deteriorated areas and achieve international goals for reducing greenhouse gasses, in addition to achieving the reforestation rates proposed in international agreements.

In addition, another proposal of the plan consists of retaking the Amazon Fund², strengthening its governance in a strategic way in the capture of funds, resources and international donations, which will be redirected to the inspection, protection and preservation of the different biomes existing in that region. . With this, it is expected to achieve satisfactory results in promoting the social and human development of the populations located there, emphasizing environmental, economic and social sustainability.

Regarding regional integration and multilateralism as strategic aspects for Brazilian international insertion, the plan defends the country's integration into the international economy in order to improve the competitiveness of the Brazilian economy through the continued increase in productivity levels, the implementation of reforms structural changes, increased investment in human capital, and modernization of regional infrastructure. These objectives are in line with the need to adjust Brazil's public debt through the creation of a medium-term "Federal Expenditure Plan", in line with the methodology adopted by OECD countries, allowing for the robust construction of fiscal scenarios in line with multi-year targets.

Through the strengthening and restoration of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), the aim is to reinforce the bank's role in supporting

small and medium-sized companies, as well as restoring the financing mechanisms of public banks for exports, in line with the best international practices. With this, it is expected to increase the degree of commercial openness and internationalization of the Brazilian economy, promoting the attraction of new investments and greater integration into global value chains, in addition to negotiating new agreements with relevant trading partners and making efforts to put in place agreements negotiated recently.

Another proposal of the plan is to intensify Brazil's participation in international peacekeeping forces, reinforcing exchanges and collaboration with different countries around the world, in addition to seeking to strengthen the country's global geopolitical vision and the pacifist and universal position of the Brazilian Armed Forces.

Thus, in what corresponds to the proposals of the government plan for Brazilian foreign policy listed throughout this text, there is a significant absence of China and how the relationship of a possible Tibet government with the Asian country will be (BALBI, 2022). Brazil's largest trading partner, China continues to emerge as a world superpower and it would be essential to discuss the relations of both countries on the global stage, especially due to the commercial weight of this Asian giant for Brazil.

Therefore, in general, the guidelines of the government plan presented by Simone Tebet's campaign in relation to Brazil's foreign policy reinforce the importance of Brazilian multilateralism; gives maintenance of Latin American physical integration; the deepening of Mercosur; the recovery of the prestige of Brazilian diplomacy in international forums and its active participation in the discussion spaces of the different groups: G20, BRICS, OECD, UN, among others; as well as using the various networks of diplomatic representations in order to facilitate bilateral flows of goods, services, people, technology and investments.

Thus, in the words of Simone Tebet, strengthening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to be the way to regain all the prestige and importance of the country on the international scene and stop being an "international pariah"(GRABOIS, 2022). In this way, the candidate highlights the need to value the country's international relations, since they are fundamental mechanisms in attracting and attracting private investments, which are "stuck" awaiting economically significant projects.

Notes

- ¹ Group currently formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and although the five countries are not a political bloc or a formal or military trade alliance, they have negotiated several trade and cooperation treaties with a view to increasing their economic growth. Available from: <https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/entenda-o-assunto/bric>. Accessed 24 Aug. 2022
- ² The Amazon Fund consists of a fundraising and donation mechanism aimed at preventing, monitoring and combating deforestation in the Legal Amazon. BRAZIL. Ministry of the Environment (org.). Amazon Fund. 2022. Available from: <http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br/pt/home/>. Accessed 28 Aug. 2022

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THE OTHER CANDIDATES

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In the last few decades, presidential elections in Brazil have become increasingly disputed. In turn, the concentration of voting intentions in two central parties reflects a growing political polarization in the country, between a right-wing or a far-right party on the one hand, and a left-wing party on the other, usually represented by the Workers' Party (PT). In this way, this article seeks to shed light on the proposals of the 'other candidates', who do not even reach 2% of the voting intentions for the 2022 presidential election.

In total, 12 candidates were registered for the 2022 presidential race. In addition to the first 4 candidates in the opinion polls, already presented in this Dossier, we present the 'others' below:

Table 1 - The ‘Other’ Presidential Candidates for the 2022 election

Political wing	Candidate to Presidency	Candidato to Vice	Political Party	Participation in former pres. elections
Left	Sofia Manzano	Antonio Alves	Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)	2014 (vice)
Left	Vera Lúcia	Kunã Yporã (Raquel Tremembé)	Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU)	2018
Left	Leonardo Péricles	Samara Martins	People's Unity (UP)	
Center-Right	Soraya Thronicke	Marcos Cintra	Union Brazil (UNIÃO)	
Right	Roberto Jefferson	Padre Kelmon Souza	Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)	
Right	Constituente Eymael	João Barbosa Bravo	Christian Democracy (DC)	1998, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
Right	Pablo Marçal	Fátima Pérola Negra	Republican Party of Social Order (PROS)	
Right	Luiz Felipe D'Ávila	Tiago Mitraud	New Party (NOVO)	

Source: the authors.

Among the 'other candidates', there are 3 representatives of Brazil's left-wing parties. Sofia Pádua Manzano, presidential candidate for the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), is an economist and professor at the State University of Southwest Bahia (UESB), affiliated to the party since 1989. Having run for the presidential elections only in 2014 - as Mauro Iasi's vice-president -, the candidate brought to her 2022 candidacy a Government Plan plan entitled “An anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist program for Brazil”.

In defense of the “working class and poor people” (MANZANO, 2022, p. 2), her government plan proposes a revolutionary transition, advocating the convening of a new Constituent Assembly and the repeal of all neoliberal counter-reforms applied in the country in recent decades. Within this proposal, Manzano defends the renationalization of strategic companies such as Vale, Embraer, Eletrobrás and Petrobrás. In addition, she proposes to recover the prerogatives of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) “as a financing instrument for the government and as a liquidity

supplier for needs of the economy” (MANZANO, 2022, p. 4). Defending the strengthening of South-South relations, integration between Latin American and Caribbean countries, and the establishment of mutually beneficial international relations, her foreign policy agenda is guided by solidarity and integration between Latin American and Caribbean peoples.

Within the international agenda, Manzano points out as a goal the strengthening of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – an institution in which Brazil played a leading role in its creation, and during Bolsonaro’s government, in 2019, announced its departure from it. Within the trade agenda, the prioritization of strategic partnerships aimed at industrial and technological development is highlighted. Furthermore, she defends the incorporation of other South American countries into the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the reversal of the suspension of Venezuela in the bloc, and the fight and denunciation of the imperialist onslaughts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS) and Summit of the Americas.

In this sense, Manzano moves away from the international agenda that has been prioritized since Michel Temer’s rise to power in 2016, proposing a rapprochement with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, and a diminished influence from the United States of America (USA). Finally, it’s worth mentioning that in her international plan, Manzano declares solidarity to Cuba, Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Vera Lucia Pereira da Silva Salgado has a degree in Social Sciences from the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) and was one of the founders of the Unified Socialist Workers Party (PSTU) in 1994. She is also the president of the party in Sergipe and the only black woman in the presidential race, in which she participates for the second consecutive time. From the same party, her vice president is Kunã Yporã, a representative from the indigenous tribe of Tremembé, also known as Raquel Tremembé (SALGADO, 2022).

Entitled “A Socialist Program for Brazil”, the Government Plan presented by the candidate does not present a specific foreign policy axis. Thus, in general terms, her program takes a stand for the prohibition of the remittance of profits abroad, the complete renationalization of privatized state-owned companies, such as Petrobras,

Eletrobrás and Vale, the expropriation of financial funds and foreign multinational companies, the fight against imperialism and against the country's dominant economic elites, and the suspension of the internal and external public debt payment. Furthermore, the candidate defends the free international transit of workers and access to documentation, labor and medical care for immigrants. Finally, Vera Lucia calls for a socialist revolution in Brazil, with the capacity to extend it to Latin American and global levels.

Lastly, Leonardo Péricles Vieira Roque, candidate for the Popular Unity Party (UP), as well as Vera Lúcia, is the only black man in the presidential race. Technician in electronics and mechanical maintenance of machines, Péricles presents a Government Plan whose central theme is the social resistance of the Brazilian working people and the fight against the dominant economic elite. His proposal defends the productive and technological development based on the recognition of the processes that generated, and continue to generate, the deindustrialization and reprimarization of the Brazilian economy, criticizing the role of the USA and foreign multinationals. In this context, Péricles proposes an “Active Industrial Policy Directed to Strategic Sectors”, aimed to generate jobs, such as investing in infrastructure in the country and renationalizing strategic state-owned companies, like Petrobras (ROQUE, 2022).

In defense of the country's economic independence from imperialist countries, in particular the USA, in his foreign agenda Pericles proposes a “Policy of Regional Integration and an Active and Sovereign Foreign Policy”. Such policies would seek to “deepen multilateral relations between neighboring countries in Latin America and return to counter-hegemonic diplomatic efforts with African and Asian strategic partners”. When proposing a rapprochement with Latin America, the candidate points out the need to intensify international exchange based on social transformation, whose goal is to overcome the underdevelopment condition (ROQUE, 2022).

As representative of the Center-right party União Brasil (UNIÃO), Soraya Vieira Thronicke is a lawyer and currently a senator for the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. The candidate lists in her Government Plan the priority of investments in the environmental, agribusiness and services sectors. According to the document, Brazil can benefit from the current geopolitical context through the implementation of a competitive food production strategy. The program proposes, for example, to stimulate the food

production and the minerals extractivism in conservation units, indigenous lands and quilombolas communities, and to “leverage national participation in the new global economy” (THRONICKE, 2022, p. 4). In addition, she points out that the foreign policy must be guided by a “cultural exchange with countries that can effectively contribute to technological and scientific development in key areas of the new green economy” (THRONICKE, 2022, p. 6).

There is no specific focus for regional cooperation, but the program highlights proposals for the Amazon and national defense. For Amazon, she proposes investing in infrastructure such as highways, regional airports and fluvial transport, and operating the integration of transportation modals. In the area of security and national defense, the candidate intends to implement an anti-drug policy through multidisciplinary actions by the federal government, municipal governments and international partnerships, besides proposing to create an integrated ‘Border Control System’ among Brazilian security forces.

As a representative of Brazil's right-wing parties, in first place there is Roberto Jefferson Monteiro Francisco², affiliated to the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), lawyer, former six-term federal deputy (1983-2005), currently under house arrest for involvement with digital anti-democracy militias, and condemned by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) during the investigations of “Mensalão”. Its Government Program proposes greater legal certainty in the legislation that regulates foreign capital, priority treatment for the agricultural agenda, and measures to facilitate imports, a matter that, despite not being mentioned, passes through the negotiations of the Common External Tariff in Mercosur. It also reaffirms the constitutional principles of Brazil's international relations, such as the self-determination of peoples, non-intervention and the peaceful solution of conflicts (FRANCISCO, 2022).

José Maria Eymael is a lawyer, former federal deputy for two terms (1987-1995) and founder of the Christian Social Democratic Party in 1995, now registered as Christian Democracy (DC), of which he is president. Its Government Guidelines, entitled “To Build a New and Better Brazil”, point as the foundations of Brazil's international relations: solidarity between nations, a foreign policy as an instrument for national development and linked to global trade routes, and a commitment to peace. The regional plan, on the other hand, received no attention, only mentioning the protection of

borders against drug and arms trafficking through the integration of Brazilian security forces (EYMAEL, 2022).

In a troubled candidacy, Pablo Henrique Costa Marçal³, a presidential candidate registered for the Republican Party of Social Order (PROS), presents himself as a businessman, investor and writer. At only 35 years old, Marçal, in his Government Plan, entitled “40 years of growth in 4 years of government”, says he is the “new leader of the nation”. Claiming to be “one of the greatest entrepreneurs in Latin America” (MARÇAL, 2022, p. 108), Marçal divides Brazilian society into categories and proposes to help them ‘climb the steps to success’.

Having investment in infrastructure as a priority agenda, the candidate defends investing in Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) to “insert the country on the path of development and prosperity” (MARÇAL, 2022, p. 12), based on a triad that guides his plan: Virtualization, Entrepreneurship, and the Change of Mindset (V.E.M.). However, in his international agenda, Marçal points out only two paths: the insertion of the country in economic blocks “of countries that are prosperous and influential in global decisions” (MARÇAL, 2022, p. 63), and the rapprochement with Africa through commercial and business cooperation.

Lastly, candidate Luiz Felipe Chaves D’Ávila, presidential candidate for the NOVO party, is a political scientist, holds a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University and is the coordinator of the ‘United for Brazil’ movement. In his Government Plan, entitled “A new Brazil for all”, D’Ávila has as his ‘Goal 8: Respected Brazil’, “to rebuild the country’s international agenda and recover its foreign policy reputation” (D’ÁVILA, 2022 p. 28. As one of the only candidates whose government plan features a prominent section to discuss its foreign policy agenda, D’Ávila defends the need to overcome the ‘anachronistic character’ of the current foreign policy and to re-establish the diplomatic pattern and the country’s relations with its traditional partners.

In this sense, the candidate defends integration through Mercosur, at the same time that he defends the establishment of new relations with multilateral institutions. Therefore, the priority of the Mercosur-European Union (EU) Agreement stands out, in which the green economy, commercial openness and public management dedicated to serving the citizens, are placed as guiding pillars of its Governmental Plan. Despite

proposing to strengthen Mercosur, the candidate also defends the unilateral opening of the Brazilian economy — contrary to principles of the regional bloc —, whose focus is the strengthening of agribusiness, and the guarantee of infrastructure for the international reinsertion of Brazil in a competitive manner. Once again, the right-wing candidates defend the privatization of state-owned companies and, just as the Temer and Bolsonaro agenda defended in recent years, Brazil's entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Thus, what can be seen when analyzing the Government Plans of the 'other candidates', whose possibilities of coming to power are minimal, is that there is nothing new, nor innovative in their proposals, there being no 'alternative' path, as spoken by them, in their attempt to reduce political polarization in the country. While leftist parties insist on supporting other leftist governments in the world, including totalitarian states like Nicaragua and North Korea, for example, their proposals to get closer to the region fall short. Although regionalism is an important instrument for Latin America and the Caribbean, hence Brazil, it is not clear what the expectations are for strengthening ALBA. And, even though Unasur has been very important for the sub continent, it is also unclear which role would Unasur have for these governments in the near future.

On the contrary, the candidacies of right-wing parties do not present, or present a minor focus, on the region. The proposals in this spectrum are limited to South America, and, more specifically, to the Southern Cone, when aimed at thinking about the progress of the agreement between the EU and Mercosur and, therefore, a rapprochement with the countries of the North. Furthermore, the prioritization of an open trade and agribusiness for these candidacies is highlighted. As a platform for development, the proposals of presidential candidates from right-wing parties favor regional fragmentation and the greater presence of extra-regional interests in areas such as infrastructure, production and trade of goods and services.

We can say that the 'other candidates', both from the right and from the left parties, reflect the lack of political balance in Brazil, so that their proposals could, in fact, consolidate national and international policies that would benefit its people. Most of the proposals are presented as empty ideas, with no plans for their implementation, or very distant from the country's reality. Therefore, instead of having candidates who present themselves as an alternative to national political polarization, we see the continuous

reproduction of the ties and preferences of national elites, institutionalized in the country's economic structure.

Notes

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- ² On August 3, 2022, during the production of this Dossier, the Brazilian Labor Party formalized the request of Father Kelmon's candidacy registration for the Presidency of the Republic to replace Roberto Jefferson. This change took place after the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) canceled the registration of Roberto Jefferson's candidacy for the presidency. To learn more, see: <https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2022/noticia/2022/09/03/ptb-formaliza-registro-de-padre-kelmon-como-candidato-substituto-de-roberto-jefferson-a-presidencia.ghtml>.
- ³ Despite having been registered at the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the PROS party, on August 15th, decided to withdraw Pablo Marçal's candidacy to support Lula da Silva's candidacy. However, Marçal expressed his opposition and said that he will fight in court to remain in the electoral dispute.

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OVERVIEW BOARD — FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONALISM IN THE CANDIDATES GOVERNMENT PLANS BY AGENDAS

Candidate	Regional Integration	South America	Latin America	Mercosur	CELAC	UNASUR	Other agendas
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)	X	X	X	X	X	X	BRICS, G20, IBSA, WTO, UN.
Jair Bolsonaro (PL)		X					EFTA, OECD, Americas, Sth. Atlantic.
Ciro Gomes (PDT)							SDG
Simone Tebet (MDB)	X	X	X	X			BRICS, G20, UN, BNDES, OECD.
OTHERS:							
Sofia Manzano (PCB)	X		X	X		X	Summits of the Am., OAS, ALBA.
Vera Lúcia (PSTU)			X				
Leonardo Péricles (UP)	X		X				
Soraya Thronicke (UNIÃO)							
Roberto Jefferson (PTB)							
Constituinte Eymael (DC)		X					
Pablo Marçal (PROS)							
Luiz Felipe D'Ávila (NOVO)	X			X			Agreement EU- Mercosur

Source: produced by the authors of the dossier.